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Major Professor: Katherine Levine Einstein, Assistant Professor of Political Science 
 
 This project studied the relationship between state wealth and student 
achievement. State wealth was measured in per capita income, and achievement in 
average NAEP test scores. Regression analysis determined a statistically significant 
relationship, where higher state income is correlated with higher average scores. This 
relationship was then examined on the district level using each states’ respective 
assessment test. Regression revealed that just like state income, district income is also a 
statistically significant indicator of student achievement. Lastly, the weight that district 
income has on scores varies depending on the state, where states with higher incomes 
have a smaller impact from district income than states with lower incomes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The topic of education and income is a popular one in political science. 
Researchers have taken almost every route possible to determine the exact impact of 
education on future earnings; they have developed increasingly complex statistical 
models to determine if this impact is real or just the product of individual ambition, 
environmental factors, etc. They have looked at the effect of socioeconomic status on 
future educational outcomes, and school quality and funding on future income. The 
reason for this obsession with education and income is that they are inherently tied 
together in this nation, and both are topics of heavy debate when discussing our nation’s 
problems in a political context. Politicians argue that to decrease poverty, we must 
increase education, yet many educational opportunities are unavailable to those who most 
need them. Poor children tend to go to poorly funded schools without the resources to 
teach them well, and then are unable to afford to go to college, thus not receiving the 
higher education that the rest of the nation does. They remain in unskilled and low paying 
jobs, failing to break the cycle of poverty. The education system is skewed toward the 
wealthy, who, while they do deserve a good education, do not need it as desperately as 
their less advantaged peers. 
 Understanding just how education and wealth interact on a precise level can help 
further political scientists and politicians understanding of how we can fix this cyclical 
problem. One analysis that has been mostly neglected in the vast literature is the state-
level effects of wealth on educational outcomes. Do students attending school in more 
wealthy states achieve more in school than students from poorer states? This analysis is 
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just one piece in the puzzle of understanding the education-income interaction, but is an 
important piece nonetheless. If poor states do have lower educational outcomes, and past 
literature has already shown that poverty follows a lack of education, then perhaps the 
way to get these states out of poverty lies in reforming the education systems to mimic 
the outcomes of the richer states. While this analysis can offer no specific solutions, it 
does provide greater insight, which is the first step in solving the nation’s problems. 
 Often state-level analyses can provide information not otherwise apparent from an 
individual analysis. Sometimes states behave differently as a whole than we would expect 
individuals to. For example, in Andrew Gelman’s book “Red State, Blue State, Rich 
State, Poor State,” he determined that individuals’ voting patterns vary depending on 
their own wealth and their state’s wealth: rich people in rich states often vote Democrat 
while rich people in poor states often vote Republican.1 It is anomalies such as these that 
I am interested in determining about educational outcomes through this analysis, for if 
they do in fact exist it could change the way that political scientists understand education 
and poverty in this country. 
 “Educational outcomes” is a broad term that is not easy to measure. Ideally, it 
would reflect exactly what and how much students gained from attending school relative 
to having stayed home. This encompasses not just subject material, such as the square 
root of 4 or who won the Revolutionary War, but also critical thinking skills, social skills, 
attention span, willingness to listen to authority, interest in learning, ambition and 
imagination, among others. These outcomes are also incredibly hard to define as being a 																																																								
1 Gelman 
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direct result of a formal education, the result of parenting, or simply a students’ natural 
inclination. For simplicity’s sake, I am defining educational outcomes simply as 
standardized test scores. Unfortunately this metric loses much of the valuable nuance 
mentioned above, and can be subject to schools “teaching to the test” while students learn 
very little substantive material, but it is a metric that has been commonly accepted by the 
literature, is easy to replicate, and is convenient for statistical analysis. 
 Since my educational outcomes metric is only considering standardized test 
scores, my analysis will also focus solely on public schools. These schools will be more 
representative of the population of the states, and will also allow for more comprehensive 
data since public schools are often required to take national and state tests, whereas 
private schools are not. 
 “State wealth” is another term that contains some nuance and is in need of 
defining for the sake of this project. While wealth can often be interpreted as net worth, 
including factors such as income, capital gains, investments, savings, and debts, I will be 
defining it simply as the per capita income of a state. Again, this is largely for 
simplicity’s sake as income is a more reliable statistic than wealth, which people often 
hide, and because income is a more widely available metric, making it easier to compare 
between different datasets.  
 Redefining the question in terms of these definitions looks like the following: Do 
states with higher per capita income have higher average standardized test scores among 
public school students than states with lower per capita incomes? The answer to this 
question as provided in this project will be structured as follows: a comprehensive review 
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of the relevant literature, a discussion of my hypotheses and the justification for each, an 
overview of methods, discussion of the results of each test, and a summary of 
conclusions. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 As I stated previously, political scientists, economists, politicians, and policy 
analysts often look to education as the key to solving the income inequality that leads to 
poverty in America. This inclination is not without empirical evidence pointing toward its 
accuracy. For example, H. S. Houthakker found as early as 1959 that there is a significant 
correlative relationship between years of schooling and after-tax income of persons in 
varying age groups.2 His study was followed by many others, which built the foundation 
for Jerry Goodman to assert in his 1979 study that this relationship is unequivocally true. 
His study was then able to focus on the specific model through which education impacts 
future earnings; linear, level-specific, credentialist, or some combination of those three.3 
David Card provided an overview of past literature proving not just a correlative 
relationship, but a causal pathway between education and earnings, stating that education 
can explain up to 35% of the variation in earnings.4 These and other similar findings 
gained the attention of Congress in 2000 with a policy paper addressed to the Joint 
Economic Committee summarizing all of these key points and more: education has an 
important effect on an individual’s economic prospects, as well as public returns in the 
form of less crime, better parenting, a more productive economy, etc.5 																																																								
2 Houthakker, Hendrik S. "Education and Income." The Review of Economics and 
Statistics (1959): 24-28. 
3 Goodman, Jerry D. "The Economic Returns of Education: An Assessment of 
Alternative Models." Social Science Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1979): 269-283. 
4 Card, David. "The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings." Handbook of Labor 
Economics 3 (1999): 1801-1863. 
5 Hall, Joshua. "Investment in Education: Private and Public Returns." In Washington 
DC: Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress. 2000. 
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By this point, the empirical evidence that education matters is too overwhelming 
to ignore. It has since been taken for granted that this relationship has implications for 
alleviating income inequality and poverty, which is the motivation for this project. Jose 
De Gregorio studied this specific question, doing an international study of nations’ levels 
of both education inequality and income inequality, and bringing the discussion to an 
aggregate level. He found that not just the level of education, but the distribution 
throughout the population was highly correlated with the amount of income inequality in 
a country: those with most educational attainment as a whole, but concentrated among 
only a few people had higher levels of income inequality than countries with a more even 
distribution of education.6 It is logical to assume that these findings will hold true within-
nation as well; that education inequality between states will be related to income 
inequality between states in some way, causally or otherwise. This project aims to 
establish that relationship. 
 While most of the literature focused on educational attainment measured in years 
of school, I find it necessary to take a different route. As I defined previously, I am 
considering educational attainment in terms of the output of schooling. How many years 
a student is in school cannot logically make much of a difference if that student does not 
perform well in school. Simply attending classes does not help one develop the skills that 
the literature believes are the cornerstone of education’s impact. For example, Goodman 
found that schooling has a profound “credential effect,” in that having completed so 																																																								
6 De Gregorio, Jose, and Jong–Wha Lee. "Education and Income Inequality: New 
Evidence from Cross‐Country Data." Review of Income and Wealth 48, no. 3 (2002): 
395-416. 
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many years of schooling gives a student desirable credentials – which implies the 
possession of certain skills or abilities that aided one in completing school, such as time 
management, collaboration, critical thinking, problem solving, and social skills such as 
the ability to sit and listen – and that these credentials were what translated to higher 
earnings since they allowed access to higher paying jobs.7  
While this may seem contradictory to my first claim that just passing school is not 
enough, Goodman’s next finding supports it; he found that completion of high school was 
correlated with minimal, if any, increase in future income, while earning a Bachelor’s 
degree was correlated with one of the largest increases in income.8 This implies that a 
college education is very important to employers in the most highly paying jobs, making 
acceptance to college a key piece in the broad umbrella of “education.” Those with high 
test scores get accepted to college, those with low scores generally do not, so 
performance in school can have one of the largest impacts on a student’s future economic 
success. To be able to receive the largest benefit of this credential effect one needs to 
perform well instead of just going through the motions of school. Educational outputs, in 
fact affect years of education, which affects future income; thus understanding 
inequalities in student performance is intrinsic in understanding income inequality. 
 Of course, a student’s personal performance is not the only factor contributing to 
her test scores; the quality and conditions of the school she is in also has this effect, if not 
always on an individual level then at least in the aggregate. The current system of 																																																								
7 Goodman, Jerry D. "The Economic Returns of Education: An Assessment of 
Alternative Models." Social Science Quarterly 60, no. 2 (1979): 269-283. 
8 Ibid. 
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allocating school funds results in about half of those funds coming from local or state 
sources, rather than the federal government. This means that the quality of ones’ school is 
largely related to how wealthy the students attending that school are. This was the main 
concern in the Supreme Court case San Antonio v. Rodriguez, in which the appellants 
argued that this funding inequality was unfair to more impoverished areas.9 Presumably 
they were not just concerned with how nice the classrooms were unless they believed that 
funding inequality was in some way relevant and perhaps affected students’ outcomes.  
Paul Wachtel attempted to determine how school quality impacts student 
achievement and thus student earnings, using school expenditure to measure school 
quality.10 He determined that “school quality significantly affects earnings both directly 
and indirectly through achievement.”11 Wachtel’s scope was limited to a specific sample 
of Air Force volunteers, but his findings have been broadened by Card and Kreuger, who 
also found that earnings increase in students who attended schools with low pupil-teacher 
ratios and higher teacher salaries.12 
																																																								
9 "San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez." Oyez - Chicago-Kent College 
of Law. Accessed April 07, 2016. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1332. 
10 For explicit justification of this metric see “The Effect of School Quality on 
Achievement, Attainment Levels, and Lifetime Earnings." Wachtel tested other presumed 
indicators of school quality including pupil-teacher ratio, enrollment, teacher salary, and 
length of school year and found that they did not produce an effect significantly different 
than simply considering expenditure. These variables were also highly correlated with 
expenditure, leading him to exclude them from his final model. 
11 Wachtel, Paul. "The Effect of School Quality on Achievement, Attainment Levels, and 
Lifetime Earnings." In Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 2, number 4, pp. 
502-536. NBER, 1975. 
12 Card, David, and Alan Krueger. Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education 
and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States. No. w3358. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 1990. 
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 Not just school expenditures, but teacher quality also has an effect on student 
achievement. Linda Darling-Hammond found that states that maintain a “professional 
teacher” policy, mandating that schools only hire teachers with specific qualifications 
who are prepared to effectively teach in their respective subjects, tend to have higher 
average standardized test scores.13 Harris and Sass found conflicting evidence of the 
impact of a teacher’s credentials on student achievement, but did find that teachers are 
able to increase the productivity of their students as their years of teaching increases, 
indicating that teacher quality insofar as it is related to practical experience can affect 
student achievement. They also found that training teachers in their specific subjects had 
a positive effect on student achievement, consistent with Darling-Hammond’s findings.14 
 The Coleman Report, commissioned by the Department of Education in 1966 to 
determine the status of educational equality in America, is often cited as evidence of the 
contrary. Coleman found that funding, and by association school quality, had little actual 
impact on student achievement.15 While researchers have been debating this point for 
years, one important feature of his analysis stands out; one often overlooked section of 
this report states that Coleman’s findings “[indicate] that it is for the most disadvantaged 
children that improvements in school quality will make the most difference in 
achievement.”16 
																																																								
13 Darling-Hammond, L., 2000. Teacher Quality and Student Achievement. Education 
policy analysis archives, 8, p.1. 
14 Harris, Douglas N., and Tim R. Sass. "Teacher Training, Teacher Quality and Student 
Achievement." Journal of Public Economics 95, no. 7 (2011): 798-812. 
15 Coleman, James S. "Equality of Educational Opportunity." (1966). 
16 Ibid. 
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 Two examples of intervening studies that demonstrate strong physical evidence in 
favor of school quality having an impact on student achievement, at least among poor 
students, are the Perry Preschool Project and the Harlem Children’s Zone. The Perry 
Preschool project was implemented in Michigan and placed children who were deemed 
“at high risk” of school failure in a high-quality preschool; “quality” in this case refers to 
a low pupil-teacher ratio, with parents and children involved in the development of a 
ciriculum that supported active learning.17 Follow-up analysis of the students throughout 
their lifetimes shows that the students in the program have had much more positive life 
outcomes than the control group, indicating that a quality school can affect future 
earnings more substantially than previously thought, and in both direct and indirect ways 
such as through lowering crime and unintended pregnancy.18  
 Harlem Children’s Zone is an area within New York City in which high-quality 
charter schools are combined with community programs in an attempt to lower the 
achievement gap that exists along racial and monetary lines. Upon studying its impact, 
Dobbie and Fryer determined that this combination has been enormously effective in 
lowering the inequality in educational achievement, and attributed a bulk of this impact to 
the schools rather than the community programs alone.19 These examples of actual 																																																								
17 Lawrence J. Schweinhart, Helen V. Barnes, and David P. Weikart. Significant 
Benefits: The High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age 27 (High/Scope Press, 
1993). 
18 For a complete list of all the metrics tested, see Lawrence J. Schweinhart, PhD. The 
High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age 40: Summary, Conclusions, and 
Frequently Asked Questions (High/Scope Press 2004). 
19 Dobbie, Will, and Roland G. Fryer Jr. Are High Quality Schools Enough to Close the 
Achievement Gap? Evidence from a Social Experiment in Harlem. No. w15473. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. 
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students displaying actual achievement gains from programs such as these that emphasize 
quality schooling bring life to the empirical evidence we have about school quality’s 
impact on student achievement. 
  If school quality was the only factor that determined a student’s educational 
achievement, then this project would need only focus on the characteristics of school 
systems and how those differ between states. I still assert, however, that the wealth of the 
state is the key feature that will determine differences in student achievement. Poor states 
have poor students, and poor students do not just perform poorly because they are not 
being taught well or given enough resources; their performance is also inherently tied to 
their status as poor students. Lee and Burkam were interested in this exact concept, and 
sought to determine what inequalities exist between rich and poor students even before 
entering school. They were able to find that socioeconomic status is arguably the 
strongest indicator of a child’s future success in school, and subsequently, as we have 
seen in the previous literature, life.  
 Upon entry to kindergarten, students in the highest socioeconomic group earned 
60% higher test scores than those of the lowest group.20 They explained these results in 
terms of the various factors that are largely associated with socioeconomic status, such as 
family structure, cognitive skills, educational expectations, etc. that impact children and 
their ability to benefit from future schooling.21 Inequalities begin before students even 
enter school and are then only exacerbated by the previously examined inequalities in 																																																								
20 Lee, Valerie E., and David T. Burkam. "Inequality at the Starting Gate." Washington, 
DC: Economic Policy Institute (2002). 
21 Ibid. 
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funding, teacher credentials and experience, access to resources, and other variables 
related to school quality. If inequalities such as these have an impact on the individual 
level, it seems plausible that in a state of mostly low-SES students, overall state 
achievement levels will be low because every individual student is performing poorly. 
This socioeconomic status effect can also be compounded within a classroom, 
even a high quality one. Many studies have determined that performance and attitudes of 
other students in a classroom or a general school environment can also influence if a 
student performs well or not.  Brookover found that of all the factors he tested as 
variables of educational social climate, educational futility stood out as having a 
particularly high effect on students’ achievement. When students feel as though they have 
little control over their success or failure, their teachers seem unconcerned with their 
success or failure, and other students do not react positively to their success, students are 
highly likely to not succeed in school. 22  Similar peer effects are also evident in 
Zimmerman’s study of college students; average students tend to perform worse when 
rooming with below average students.23  
 Studies by Henderson et al. and Hanushek found similar evidence in support of 
peer effects, though of an opposite nature. Both of their studies tested the effects of high 
achieving peers on a student’s performance, rather than low achieving peers. Both found 
																																																								
22 Brookover, Wilbur B., John H. Schweitzer, Jeffrey M. Schneider, Charles H. Beady, 
Patricia K. Flood, and Joseph M. Wisenbaker. "Elementary School Social Climate and 
School Achievement." American Educational Research Journal 15, no. 2 (1978): 301-
318. 
23 Zimmerman, David J. "Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural 
Experiment." Review of Economics and Statistics 85, no. 1 (2003): 9-23. 
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that when surrounded by high achieving peers, students tend to perform better.24 These 
studies taken together offer the potential for a more compounded effect on educational 
inequality than previously considered.  
 At this point, it is useful to step back and determine the implications all of this 
information has on education inequality in America. Each of these spheres of literature 
provides a specific view into what affects educational outcomes, and they appear to all 
compound upon each other. Briefly: 
1. Students who do well in school are able to go to college and obtain high paying 
jobs 
2. High-quality schools can help support students to do well in school 
3. Poor students tend to do worse in school than more wealthy students  
4. A student’s peer environment also has an impact – high-achieving peers can make 
a student perform better in school, and vice versa 
Adding to these points the facts that 1) low SES students tend to live in poor areas with 
other low SES students and 2) low SES areas tend to have lower quality schools than 
higher SES areas, I see one logical outcome: poor students who are already predicted to 
do poorly, are then enrolled in low quality schools that cannot provide the support to 
overcome that hurdle, causing them to do even worse, all the while being surrounded by 
other students who are predicted to do poorly, which makes their feelings of educational 																																																								
24 Hanushek, Eric A., John F. Kain, Jacob M. Markman, and Steven G. Rivkin. "Does 
Peer Ability Affect Student Achievement?." Journal of Applied Econometrics 18, no. 5 
(2003): 527-544 and Henderson, Vernon, Peter Mieszkowski, and Yvon Sauvageau. 
"Peer Group Effects and Educational Production Functions." Journal of Public 
Economics10, no. 1 (1978): 97 
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futility rise, causing them to do even worse. These students are then unable to go to 
college and obtain high paying jobs, thus remaining in the poverty that initially predicted 
their lack of success in school. All the cards are stacked against them, so to speak, greatly 
limiting any hope of breaking the cycle for the next generation. 
 This exact cycle is illustrated well in a study done on California public school 
systems, whose aim was to determine the extent and effects of unequal resource 
distribution among California schools. They found, predictably, that resources were 
uneven and that this uneven distribution of resources was contributing to the lack of 
student success in more impoverished, urban areas, but that most of the lack of success 
was due to socioeconomic factors, just as I have outlined.25 I expect to replicate the 
results of this study through this project, but on the much larger scope of a cross-state, 
nation-wide population. 
																																																								
25 Betts, Julian R., Kim S. Reuben, and Anne Danenberg. Equal Resources, Equal 
Outcomes? The Distribution of School Resources and Student Achievement in California. 
Public Policy Institute of California, 500 Washington Street, Suite 800, San Francisco, 
CA 94111, 2000. 
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THE PROJECT 
 This project is focused on two levels of analysis. On the state level, I hypothesize 
that wealthy states will have higher student achievement than poor states. Thinking that 
this relationship might not be so straightforward at more local levels, I am also 
implementing a district-level analysis, hypothesizing that within each particular state, rich 
school districts will have higher student achievement than poor school districts.  
 The rest of the paper will be broken down into methods, data, and results of each 
of these hypotheses, with overall conclusions at the end. 
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Hypothesis 1: Rich states have higher achievement than poor states 
 This is the most straightforward of my hypotheses, and I have been outlining the 
logic behind it throughout my review of the literature. If individual wealth is an important 
predictor of students’ achievement, then a state-level analysis just measures this 
phenomenon in the aggregate; again, rich states are populated with rich students, who 
will perform better and bring state average test scores up, while the opposite is true of 
poor states populated by poor students. State wealth will be measured in terms of per 
capita income in 2013 inflation-adjusted dollars, as per the 2011-2013 American 
Community Survey three-year estimates of income.  Student achievement is measured by 
eighth-grade scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Since only math 
and reading scores are reported for all states, I am using an average of these two scores to 
compute the composite score for each state. The test is only administered to fourth, 
eighth, and twelfth grade students. I am using eighth grade scores because it should 
provide the most balance between the effects of students’ background characteristics and 
the effects of school characteristics of all the ages tested. We can assume that by the 
twelfth grade, the school will have had its maximum impact, yet by only fourth grade, 
background characteristics will still remain at the forefront of students’ achievement. 
Eighth grade lies right in the middle of the two, providing a crude middle ground that is 
useful for this analysis. 
 I am conducting a bivariate regression analysis between these two variables, 
which yields the equation: 
Average NAEP score = 417.486 + 0.002(Per Capita Income) + e 
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Here, e represents the error term. The small income coefficient seems to show that 
income does not actually create much practical difference in scores, regardless of 
statistical significance. However, this is misleading; income is measured in single dollars, 
but of course in reality we measure it in thousands of dollars, meaning it can instead be 
interpreted to say that for every additional $2000 of a state’s per capita income, we can 
reasonably expect the average NAEP score to increase by 1 point. This then creates a 
huge disparity where Mississippi, the poorest state with a per capita income of $20,369, 
and Connecticut, the richest state with a per capita income of $37,468, are predicted to 
have a difference in average scores of about 34 points. Scoring for the NAEP places 
students in one of three categories: Basic, Proficient, or Advanced. To earn Basic, a 
student must score at least a 243, and to earn Advanced she must earn a 323 or higher. 
This provides a range of only 80 points, so a difference of 34 based largely on which state 
a student is raised and educated in is certainly cause for concern. 
 The magnitude of the differences in predicted results only means so much; what is 
really important is the statistical significance of the effect we see. The regression analysis 
shows that these results are in fact statistically significant and explain a large portion of 
the variation in average state scores. Income had a p-value of 0, far below the typical 
cutoff of 0.05, indicating that any difference found in state scores based on their income 
is incredibly unlikely to be the product of random chance or measurement error. The R2 
of this analysis was 0.36, which means that approximately one-third of the difference in 
test scores can be predicted by differences between the income of states; a large portion 
considering all the other factors that may be in effect. 
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These other factors at stake are important to look into, however. Perhaps 
including other variables in my analysis will render income to lose its significance 
entirely. The other variables that I believe have the greatest chance of doing this are 
differences in teacher qualifications between states, and the variation in the levels of 
funding that schools receive in each state, as these were both variables that many other 
researchers have been analyzing for decades in regards to student achievement. 
Teacher Qualifications 
First, I will control for the existence of “professional teacher laws” by using a 
multivariate analysis. As the literature mentioned, these are laws dictating that teachers 
have certain levels of education and other certifications. Since I am trying to isolate the 
effect on income alone, it becomes necessary to determine if these laws are producing 
better-quality teachers, and if those teachers are having an impact on students that is 
statistically significant to undermine the effects of income. Qualifications for teacher 
certification vary greatly between states, so measuring this variable simply as the 
presence or absence of a law requiring higher qualifications is impractical. Instead, I have 
coded each state’s qualifications based on comparisons to the other state’s qualifications, 
and determined which specific credentials are common, or make a state unique or in 
some way more difficult to become a teacher in. Coding was simple: if a state required a 
specific qualification, that qualification was coded 1, if not it was coded 0, and then a 
total of all the qualifications was added to determine each states’ “Qualification Score.”  
I found that most states require teachers to have a Bachelor’s degree in education, 
often with formal education in the content area they plan to teach, have taken both a basic 
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skills test and a content area test to prove proficiency, and completed a practicum or other 
student teaching experience. Some states also had extra requirements such as completion 
of an ELL, special education, and/or computer skills course, as well as training in health-
related matters such as CPR or drug counseling. Some states required potential teachers 
to pass an exam on the US or state Constitution, and others were required to take courses 
in what were called “human relations.”  
Running a multivariate regression of NAEP scores and state’s income, controlling 
for states’ Qualification Scores yielded the equation: 
Average NAEP score = 411.111 + 0.002(per capita income) + 1.650(qualification score) + e 
Not only did income remain significant at p<0.05 (p=0.00), but the number of 
qualifications a state required of its teachers was actually not statistically significant 
(p=0.192). I worried this model was measuring the wrong thing: some of the 
qualifications required were undoubtedly more relevant to a teacher’s overall quality than 
others, so it seemed problematic to give them all the same weight in my coding. 
Considering the possibility that a state that only required the aforementioned auxiliary 
skills, and nothing else, would be coded as having a higher Qualification Score than a 
state that hypothetically required every teacher to possess a PhD made me doubt the 
inherent validity of this coding. So to be safe, I identified the qualifications that seemed 
the most relevant to overall teacher quality, what I call the “Major Qualifications,” and 
isolated them for a secondary analysis. 
Major Qualifications include all of the most prevalent ones: Bachelor’s degree, 
focused study on a content area, completion of basic skills and content area tests, and 
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completion of a practicum. All of these requirements result in demonstrated knowledge 
of teaching ability, at least to the point of graduation from a program or passage of a test, 
so they seemed the most pertinent to any real distinction between good teachers and bad 
teachers. Additionally, these requirements existed in 15 or more states, with most present 
in 40 or more, indicating that many states viewed them as valuable. I also included the 
achievement of a Master’s Degree in education as a Major Qualification despite only one 
state requiring it as the minimum degree necessary for certification, because it can be 
presumed that further formal education in a graduate school setting should have some 
distinct impact on a teacher’s ability to teach. The potential impact of an additional 
degree seemed significant enough to include as “major.” I also included whether states 
have a probationary certification that teachers must complete before becoming fully 
licensed, as this provides time for the school system to evaluate the teacher’s practical 
ability and grant them licensure or not from there; we can assume that this allows fewer 
under-qualified teachers to actually enter the field as it acts as a secondary vetting 
process. 
 Including only Major Qualifications reduced my variable pool by half, and 
produced the following equation: 
Average NAEP score = 405.896 + 0.002(per capita income) + 2.801(major qualifications) + e 
Again, the significance of income did not waver (p=0.00) and the number of teacher 
qualifications required failed to produce a statistically significant change in scores 
(p=0.079). The new teacher qualification p-value is much closer to standard levels of 
significance than in the previous model, indicating that perhaps with even more precise 
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coding, teacher qualifications might make a statistical difference in students’ test scores, 
however regardless of this increased significance, we can see that state income still 
remains significant, strengthening the findings from the original bivariate model. 
Education Funding 
 Eliminating teacher quality as a confounder against income’s significance, I now 
turn my attention to funding. The literature illustrates a robust debate about the particular 
impact that funding has or does not have on student achievement. Regardless of any 
effect that it may or may not have, it is still necessary to determine if income loses its 
impact when funding is considered. It seems logical that more wealthy states may also be 
funding their schools more heavily, which could be creating a spurious relationship 
between state per capita income and test scores. Controlling for the effects of funding, 
measured as dollars spent on education26, yields the following equation: 
Average NAEP score = 416.250 + 0.002(per capita income) – 0.000000139(funding) + e 
 Like teacher qualifications, funding does nothing to impact the statistical 
significance of income (p=0.00), and is itself not statistically significant (p=0.183). There 
is not sufficient evidence to conclude that any differences in NAEP scores can be 
attributed to differences in funding rather than random chance, when per capita income is 
also taken into account.  
 The funding coefficient raises various questions. First, it is an incredibly small 
number, which seems troubling at first, but can be explained by the fact that funding, like 
income, is measured in single dollars, yet every state spends at least $1 million on 																																																								
26 For a thorough justification of my choice to use this metric as opposed to state revenue 
allocated toward education, see Appendix A. 
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education. This number means, in reality, that for every $100 million spent, test scores 
are predicted to drop by about 1 point (if funding had been statistically significant). 
Second, it seems at first glance that funding should not be associated with a decrease in 
test scores; in fact, the literature says the opposite. While the exact mechanisms behind 
this phenomenon are unable to be determined in a simple regression analysis, I can 
speculate that one potential reason for this result is that increased funding has become a 
reaction to poor student performance. State officials might be spending large amounts of 
money in an attempt to compensate for how poorly their students are doing, while in 
reality they are doing little to improve test scores, and skewing my results. 
 Funding in terms of simple dollar amounts may not represent how this money 
functions in reality. Not only do we not know how this money is allocated, but it is 
important to note exactly what additional resources this money can actually provide. 
Considering that different states have different costs of living, one dollar in Mississippi 
can buy significantly more than one dollar in Connecticut. This means that to provide the 
same resources to schools, Connecticut would need to spend more than Mississippi; this 
may be the explanation behind the results from the last equation. Presumably, if two 
states are providing the same resources, but one state is spending much more to do so, 
then it would appear as if funding is having no effect when in reality it actually is. To 
remedy this issue, it is necessary to instead use a variable of funding as a percentage of 
total spending, rather than strict funding. This new variable situates education funding in 
the broader context of how much money it takes to fuel the state as a whole, and 
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effectively acts as a control for the cost of living (eg. the fact that teachers would need to 
earn more in certain states to be competitive). 
 Using this new variable in my analysis yields an equation quite different from the 
previous one: 
Average NAEP score = 409.571 + 0.003(per capita income) + 0.582(funding/total spending) + e 
Instead of lowering scores as strict funding did, funding as a percent of total spending 
serves to raise our predicted values of test scores, and is statistically significant at p<0.05 
(p=0.043). Not only does this newfound significance capture differences in cost of living 
in each state, but it may also be illuminating a consequence of a less tangible 
phenomenon. The significance of the funding/spending variable may be reflective of a 
difference in commitment to education by some states over others. States that value 
education more highly are probably more likely to spend a greater share of their limited 
tax revenue on it. They are probably more willing to put forth the effort to research where 
and how to spend this money in the most productive ways that are the most useful to 
students, thereby getting the most out of the money they spend. These states are also 
more likely to emphasize the importance of education to their citizens, who in turn 
emphasize it to their children. This creates a culture that provides positive reinforcement 
for educational success: a sort of macro-level peer effect that could help explain why 
students in these states demonstrate higher achievement. 
 All of this speculation is interesting and could add tremendous insight into the 
literature with further research. However, what is most important for this analysis is that 
despite the significance of funding as a percent of total spending, the per capita income of 
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a state remains significant (p=0.003), strengthening my previous findings that a state’s 
average income has an impact on student achievement. 
Summary of Results 
By analyzing the effects of per capita income on NAEP test scores across all fifty 
states, I can conclude that the wealth of a state has a statistically significant impact on 
student achievement. More specifically, states with higher incomes produce students who 
demonstrate higher achievement on standardized tests. These results are consistent even 
when controlling for factors the literature has determined may also affect student 
achievement; specifically, the effects of states’ requirements that teachers be more highly 
qualified and the effects of states’ spending more money on education. Education 
spending becomes a significant predictor of student scores only when measured as a 
percentage of a states’ total spending, but does not reduce the significance of income. 
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Hypothesis 2: Rich districts have higher achievement than poor districts in 
the same state 
 Bringing my analysis down to the district level provides an avenue through which 
to determine if the seemingly pervasive effect of wealth, again as measured in per capita 
income, still exists at the more localized level of school districts. In addition, this analysis 
will determine if this effect operates in the same way in each state, or if certain states 
experience it to different degrees or perhaps not at all. 
 As mentioned above, I am using school district per capita income as a measure of 
district wealth, in order to maintain consistency with my state-level income variable. Test 
scores were not as straightforward to convert to a district-level analysis, however. NAEP 
results are not reported at the school district level, rendering them obsolete. Instead, I 
relied on the individual achievement tests administered by each state, as per the mandate 
of No Child Left Behind. These tests are incredibly varied in nature, as is the scoring and 
the standards that determine if a student is considered “proficient” and given a passing 
score.  
For the scope of this analysis, these variations are not actually problematic. While 
it may be difficult to compare the scores of, say, Idaho to those of Florida, given the 
differences in the test structures, expectations, rigor, etc., I am only focusing on each 
state, and the districts within. Thus, each district within Florida is administered the same 
test, and is perfectly comparable to each other district. Similarly for Idaho, New Mexico, 
etc. Hypothetically, even if a particular state has a lower benchmark of success, and thus 
produces relatively high passage rates in the 80-90% range, every district is measured 
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based on those low benchmarks. So even if the lowest passage rate in a state is 79 and the 
highest is 100, we can still see if the lowest rate corresponds with the poorest district and 
the highest with the richest. The same can be done with a state that only produces passage 
rates in the 40-50% range, because again the districts are only being compared within 
state.  
 Rather than using raw scores as I did for the NAEP, I am instead measuring 
district achievement by the percentage of students to earn a passing score, usually 
recorded as “Proficient or Higher,” or some variation of this. This is because every state 
reports their scores in this fashion, while only some states provide the raw scores. 
 Unfortunately due to lack of available data, I was forced to omit five states from 
this analysis. Kansas, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota were 
omitted, as state achievement test results were not reported at the district level, or else 
these reports were difficult to obtain or impractical to use for various reasons. As such, I 
recognize that this analysis is incomplete and cannot be used to extrapolate any effects 
onto these five states. Similarly, Hawaii only has one school district, and thus was 
omitted from my regression analyses for this hypothesis, as it had nothing to compare at 
the intra-state level this analysis is focused on. 
 This hypothesis will follow a similar structure as Hypothesis 1, with the exception 
of the teacher qualifications control. Since teacher qualifications are determined at the 
state level, requirements would affect all districts within a state equally and thus does not 
provide for an interesting metric of variation. Education spending, however, remains 
interesting and will be pursued as a control variable later in this section. 
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First, I am using a bivariate regression analysis to determine the effects of district 
income on passage rates in each particular state. Since this analysis produced 44 
individual equations, I have included them in Appendix B rather than producing them 
here. These resulting equations indicate that for every state except Delaware and 
Maryland, there is a statistically significant effect of the wealth of individual school 
districts on the passage rates of the respective state test at p<0.05. With the exception of 
these two, it appears that district-level results do mirror state-level results, as predicted.  
 While it is interesting to note the similarities between Delaware and Maryland in 
terms of geography, history, size, etc. that may or may not be at play in what is making 
these states distinct from the others, I am not at liberty to make any conclusions as to why 
this may be. This would be an interesting topic for a further researcher who has the tools 
to detect nuance in policy implementation or other characteristics of these two states. 
Education Funding 
 
 As we saw previously, education funding has the potential to be a significant 
factor affecting student achievement. Since this effect occurred only when taking funding 
in terms relative to the state, I am curious to see how it operates within each particular 
state and each particular district as well. I gathered information on how much money is 
spent on education within each school district from the 2013 Annual Survey of School 
System Finances. This information is reported as “per pupil” expenditures, which 
accounts for the extreme variation in district size that was not present on the state level.  
 Running a multivariate analysis with passage rates as the dependent variable, and 
district income and district spending as the independent variables again yields 44 
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individual regression equations, produced in Appendix C. Education spending is only 
statistically significant in 18 states at p<0.05: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin.  
 What might these states have in common that led to spending having a significant 
effect on achievement test passage rates? The literature, particularly the Coleman Report, 
noted that spending on education has the largest impact on the achievement of students 
from low economic backgrounds, so one potential was that these states were the ones 
with the lowest overall per capita incomes. A cursory glance at the states tells us that this 
may not be the case, as Connecticut, New Jersey, and Massachusetts are included, and 
these are among the wealthiest states.  
 Plotting the regression coefficients of education spending against the overall state 
income helped to provide a visual understanding of how the significance of spending 
relates to states’ income. The statistically significant regression coefficients tend to have 
the largest magnitudes, meaning that in these states, every one extra dollar of district 
incomes produces the largest changes in predicted passage rates as compared to the other 
states’ coefficients. The graph produced in Appendix D shows that the statistically 
significant regression coefficients tend to correspond to the wealthiest states as well as 
the poorest states. The states that did not return a significant result are largely the ones in 
the middle of the income distribution. Because of the non-linearity of this trend, it would 
be misleading to run a regression to determine if a state income has a significant impact 
on the magnitude of these coefficients, so we are just left with the visual, and more 
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unanswered questions. A more complex model that can take into account the nuances of 
each of these states’ spending policies, as well as demographics, size, and other factors, 
would be more appropriate to pursue this question further. 
Variation of Effect Between States 
 
 Since spending did not produce universal significance, I am going to move back 
to the test that did: the bivariate analysis using just passage rates and district income. In 
every state, income was significant, but is it significant to the same degree? Perhaps in 
some states, higher district income produces a much larger predicted change in passage 
rates than it does in other states. To test this assumption, I produced a similar graph to the 
one just described, plotting the district income coefficients from the original regression 
equations against state income. This graph, produced below as Figure 1, shows a much 
more linear relationship between the income of states and the magnitude of the 
coefficients. It appears as though the higher the state income, the lower the coefficient, or 
in other words, that the district income in wealthier states has a smaller impact on passage 
rates than the district income in poorer states. These results are corroborated with a 
regression analysis between these variables – the coefficients of district income and the 
state income – that determines that state income is a statistically significant predictor of 
the impact that a district’s wealth will have on passage rates, at p<0.05 (p=0.00).  
District Income Coeff. = 0.002 – 0.000000039(State Income) + e 
This equation is less intuitive to interpret than the others, but it just means that for every 1 
extra dollar of state income, we can expect a change of . R2 for this regression is only 
0.2071, meaning that state income only predicts about 20% of district income impact. It 
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may not tell the whole story, but state income certainly does not stop being relevant at 
more local levels. 
 
Figure 1 
Summary of Results 
 
 Like state income, district income also has a significant effect on student 
achievement, this time measured in state achievement test passage rates. Unlike the state-
level analysis, education spending on a district level has varying effects across different 
states, but seems to impact those states at the low and high ends of the income 
distribution. The specific phenomena at work behind this result are unclear, but certainly 
warrant further research. On a general level, the fact that education spending became 
significant in at least some cases, regardless of what those cases are, is consistent with 
AL
AKAZ
AR
CA CO
CT
DEFL
GA
ID
IL
IN IAKY LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
OH
OR
PA
RI
SC
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WAWV
WI
WY
0
.0
00
5
.0
01
.0
01
5
.0
02
_b
[d
ist
_in
co
m
e]
20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
income
		
31 
findings in the literature. Betts found that spending gained significance at the district 
level, as does this analysis in many cases. 
 It is also interesting to note that while the impact of district income on state test 
passage rates is significant in all cases, it presents varying degrees of strength. The higher 
a state’s per capita income, the less of an effect the income of each individual school 
district has on passage rates. This illustrates that perhaps state income has more of a 
primary effect than district income, but unfortunately this idea cannot be explored further 
without implementing a more complex model. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
	 Overall, I was able to determine that the income of a state is a statistically 
significant predictor of student achievement within that state. The inclusion of various 
potential confounders was unable to shake this significance, lending support to its 
ubiquity. Similarly, on the district level, income of school districts was a statistically 
significant predictor of student achievement within those districts, in 42 of the 44 states I 
was able to measure.  Only Delaware and Maryland defected from this result, and I 
recommend that future research be conducted to determine what particular characteristics 
of these two eerily similar states are at play in creating this result. Perhaps a case study of 
these states could uncover specific legislation attempting to improve achievement in the 
poorest districts, or determine how their size or geography might play a role. 
 The district-level analysis also revealed that district income has a varied affect on 
achievement, based in part on the income of the state. As stated previously, it would be 
interesting to study the extent of this effect, perhaps determining which level matters 
more. Knowing this information could have important implications on our understanding 
of education inequality. If even the poor districts of rich states are performing just as 
well, and in some cases even better than rich districts in poor states, because ultimately 
the largest indicator of student achievement ends up being state level income, then this 
would put the poorest districts in the poorest states at an even greater disadvantage than 
researchers previously thought.  	 One limitation of this study resides in the exclusion of states. Perhaps with access 
to more secured data files, these states would be able to be included and the analysis re-
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run to test its claims among the whole population. Another limitation that I discussed 
previously is the fact that comparing passage rates of the individual state tests is tricky. 
Some states may appear to have higher achievement when in reality their standards for 
passing the test are just lower, so in practical terms their students are not equipped with 
the same skills as students from other states, despite the appearance that they are. Thus 
the comparison of the coefficients from my intra-state district analysis may be skewed. 
This problem cannot be reliably eliminated without the use of a standardized, national 
test. Future research could examine the specifics of each state test and determine a way to 
standardize the benchmarks, but that is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
  My analysis’ main weakness is its simplicity. Many researchers conduct many, 
more complicated statistical models that can account for a myriad of factors and nuances 
that my model simply cannot. However, it is useful as a starting point. We now have 
evidence that the correlations outlined in the conclusion exist, and from here, we can dig 
deeper into the complexities in future endeavors. 
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Appendix A 
I had originally gathered both data on educational spending and educational 
revenue from the ACS Annual Survey of School System Finances. The following graph 
and regression model illustrate the predictably high correlation between the two, 
necessitating me to pick one of them in order to avoid collinearity problems. I chose 
spending because theoretically some of the revenue raised will not be spent, and this 
money can therefore not make any impact on students; if it is not being used to buy 
resources, pay teachers, etc. and is instead sitting in a reserve, then it is not useful for my 
analysis because it cannot impact anything. 
 
reg ed_spend funding 
ed_spend Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 95% Conf. Interval 
funding 0.8849272 0.0071634 123.53 0 0.8705242 0.8993302 
_cons 33918.28 131201.6 0.26 0.797 -229880.3 297716.8 
R2= 0.9969       
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Appendix B 
 
Alabama 
      pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0013441 0.0001265 10.62 0 0.0010937 0.0015945 
_cons 6.68377 2.882836 2.32 0.022 0.9791577 12.38838 
R2 = 0.4705      
       
       Alaska 
      pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0007713 0.0001856 4.16 0 0.0003986 0.0011439 
_cons 4.972543 5.225486 0.95 0.346 -5.518058 15.46314 
R2 = 0.2529       
       
       
Arizona       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008152 0.0000844 9.66 0 0.0006487 0.0009817 
_cons 10.22221 1.941111 5.27 0 6.394303 14.05011 
R2 = 0.3202       
       
       
Arkansas       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0011701 0.0002171 5.39 0 0.0007421 0.001598 
_cons 42.84258 4.389226 9.76 0 34.18975 51.49541 
R2 = 0.1220       
       
       
California       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006926 0.0000323 21.44 0 0.0006291 0.000756 
_cons 37.8756 1.055849 35.87 0 35.80236 39.94884 
R2 = 0.4112       
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Colorado 
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006911 0.000148 4.67 0 0.0003979 0.0009842 
_cons 12.48414 4.079306 3.06 0.003 4.404561 20.56372 
R2 = 0.1582       
       
       
Connecticut       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0005985 0.0000745 8.03 0 0.0004511 0.0007459 
_cons 51.19521 3.194801 16.02 0 44.8728 57.51763 
R2 = 0.3387       
       
       
Delaware       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008527 0.0005812 1.47 0.168 -0.0004137 0.002119 
_cons 49.49464 15.9114 3.11 0.009 14.82668 84.1626 
R2 = 0.1521       
       
       
Florida       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008763 0.0002216 3.95 0 0.0004334 0.0013192 
_cons 30.94198 5.171165 5.98 0 20.60497 41.27899 
R2 = 0.2015       
       
       
Georgia       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0014373 0.0001617 8.89 0 0.0011181 0.0017564 
_cons 4.225918 3.365984 1.26 0.211 -2.417765 10.8696 
R2 = 0.3135       
       
Idaho       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0004089 0.0001791 2.28 0.025 0.0000531 0.0007646 
_cons 79.071 3.763355 21.01 0 71.59444 86.54756 
R2 = 0.0548       
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Illinois       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0011028 0.0000495 22.27 0 0.0010055 0.0012 
_cons 3.774129 1.511062 2.5 0.013 0.806691 6.741567 
R2 = 0.4452       
       
       
Indiana       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008567 0.0001052 8.15 0 0.0006496 0.0010638 
_cons 59.13547 2.539333 23.29 0 54.13455 64.1364 
R2 = 0.2078       
       
       
Iowa       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008657 0.000131 6.61 0 0.0006078 0.0011235 
_cons 48.1512 3.520984 13.68 0 41.22137 55.08102 
R2 = 0.1305       
       
       
Kentucky       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0007852 0.0001263 6.22 0 0.0005355 0.001035 
_cons 31.47378 2.782628 11.31 0 25.97168 36.97588 
R2 = 0.2188       
       
       
Louisiana       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008403 0.0001766 4.76 0 0.0004861 0.0011945 
_cons -2.593171 3.861105 -0.67 0.505 -10.33757 5.151225 
R2 = 0.2994       
       
       
Maine       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0013547 0.0001812 7.47 0 0.0009955 0.0017139 
_cons 27.19263 4.884999 5.57 0 17.51072 36.87454 
R2 = 0.3389       
		
38 
Maryland       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income -.0001702 0.0002672 -0.64 0.532 -0.0007315 0.0003912 
_cons 40.49813 8.982706 4.51 0 21.62616 59.37009 
R2 = 0.0220       
       
       
Massachusetts      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008481 0.0000657 12.91 0 0.000718 0.0009783 
_cons 37.75796 2.687322 14.05 0 32.43389 43.08203 
R2 = 0.5960       
       
       
Michigan       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0012914 0.0000716 18.03 0 0.0011506 0.0014321 
_cons 6.592181 1.795712 3.67 0 3.063864 10.1205 
R2 =0.4008       
       
       
Mississippi       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0014181 0.0002381 5.95 0 0.0009468 0.0018894 
_cons 33.32232 4.512188 7.38 0 24.39214 42.2525 
R2 = 0.2210       
       
       
Missouri       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0007989 0.0001164 6.86 0 0.0005701 0.0010277 
_cons 24.29022 2.606781 9.32 0 19.16671 29.41374 
R2 = 0.0981       
       
       
Montana       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0012544 0.000171 7.34 0 0.000917 0.0015918 
_cons 11.78538 4.438558 2.66 0.009 3.027078 20.54368 
R2 = 0.2302       
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Nebraska       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0010672 0.0004122 2.59 0.013 0.0002365 0.0018979 
_cons 38.61647 11.12227 3.47 0.001 16.20101 61.03193 
R2 = 0.1322       
       
       
Nevada       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0015607 0.000345 4.52 0.001 0.0008154 0.0023061 
_cons 0.4233276 9.096363 0.05 0.964 -19.22817 20.07483 
R2 = 0.6115       
       
       
New Hampshire      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0010522 0.0001359 7.74 0 0.0007827 0.0013216 
_cons 17.63427 4.692988 3.76 0 8.327901 26.94064 
R2 = 0.3658       
       
       
New Jersey       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006535 0.0000467 14.01 0 0.0005617 0.0007452 
_cons 15.20448 1.923744 7.9 0 11.42193 18.98703 
R2 = 0.3411       
       
       
New Mexico       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.000901 0.0002442 3.69 0 0.000415 0.001387 
_cons 30.26573 5.406797 5.6 0 19.50586 41.0256 
R2 = 0.1454       
       
       
New York       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0003874 0.0000151 25.58 0 0.0003577 0.0004172 
_cons 3.755878 0.5215617 7.2 0 2.731627 4.78013 
R2 = 0.5146       
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North Carolina      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.001676 0.0001956 8.57 0 0.0012882 0.0020637 
_cons -2.804932 4.343173 -0.65 0.52 -11.41386 5.803991 
R2 = 0.4046       
       
       
Ohio       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0005719 0.0000459 12.45 0 0.0004816 0.0006621 
_cons 70.13977 1.224837 57.26 0 67.73371 72.54583 
R2 = 0.2241       
       
       
Oregon       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0013205 0.0001596 8.28 0 0.0010052 0.0016358 
_cons 11.90668 3.908964 3.05 0.003 4.18294 19.63043 
R2 = 0.3135       
       
       
Pennsylvania       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0011686 0.0000597 19.59 0 0.0010514 0.0012859 
_cons 13.12079 1.697768 7.73 0 9.784742 16.45683 
R2 = 0.4464       
       
       
Rhode Island       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.00125 0.0001057 11.82 0 0.0010331 0.0014669 
_cons -7.703457 3.963447 -1.94 0.062 -15.83578 0.4288631 
R2 = 0.8381       
       
       
South Carolina      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0014064 0.00026 5.41 0 0.0008888 0.0019239 
_cons 35.50048 5.526 6.42 0 24.50125 46.4997 
R2 = 0.2702       
		
41 
Tennessee       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0012602 0.0001738 7.25 0 0.0009158 0.0016046 
_cons 25.1361 3.69439 6.8 0 17.81754 32.45466 
R2 = 0.3155       
       
       
Texas       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008537 0.0000612 13.95 0 0.0007336 0.0009738 
_cons 19.86089 1.506433 13.18 0 16.9046 22.81719 
R2 = 0.1690       
       
       
Utah       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0005546 0.0002021 2.74 0.009 0.0001447 0.0009646 
_cons 30.89841 4.753046 6.5 0 21.25879 40.53803 
R2 = 0.1729       
       
       
Vermont       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0011317 0.0002283 4.96 0 0.0006778 0.0015856 
_cons 14.50628 6.588067 2.2 0.03 1.409639 27.60293 
R2 = 0.2222       
       
       
Virginia       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0002948 0.0000836 3.53 0.001 0.0001288 0.0004607 
_cons 25.69503 2.310422 11.12 0 21.10633 30.28373 
R2 = 0.1191       
       
       
Washington       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0010095 0.0000959 10.53 0 0.0008205 0.0011985 
_cons 28.77426 2.603411 11.05 0 23.64319 33.90534 
R2 = 0.3371       
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West Virginia      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0010371 0.0002636 3.93 0 0.0005081 0.0015662 
_cons 23.61072 5.581368 4.23 0 12.41088 34.81055 
R2 = 0.2293       
       
       
Wisconsin       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008134 0.0000533 15.26 0 0.0007085 0.0009182 
_cons 23.36363 1.462206 15.98 0 20.48734 26.23993 
R2 = 0.4109       
       
       
Wyoming       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0009387 0.0003037 3.09 0.003 0.000327 0.0015503 
_cons 47.47067 8.481188 5.6 0 30.38868 64.55266 
R2 = 0.1751       
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Appendix C 
* = p<0.05 
 
*Alabama 
      pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0014314 .0001217 11.76 0 0.0011905 0.006723 
dist_spend -.0030885 .0007757 -3.98 0 -.0046236 -.0015533 
_cons 31.66404 6.841742 4.63 0 18.12444 45.20365 
R2 = 0.5297      
       
       Alaska 
      pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0007256 0.0001876 3.87 0 0.0003488 0.0011024 
dist_spend -.0002043 .0001562 -1.31 0.197 -.000518 .0001094 
_cons 11.56589 7.233905 1.60 0.116 -2.963839 26.09561 
dist_income 0.0007256 0.0001876 3.87 0 0.0003488 0.0011024 
       
       
Arizona       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008182 0.0000856 9.56 0 0.0006495 0.0009869 
dist_spend -.0000427 .000182 -0.23 0.815 -.0004015 .0003161 
_cons 10.55329 2.403413 4.39 0 5.813571 15.29301 
R2 = 0.3203       
       
       
*Arkansas       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0007894 0.0002113 3.74 0 0.0003728 0.0012061 
dist_spend -.0032736 .000553 -5.92 0 -.0043638 -.0021833 
_cons 80.97192 7.619654 10.63 0 65.95027 95.99357 
R2 = 0.2486       
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California 
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006965 0.0000324 21.50 0 0.0006329 0.0007601 
dist_spend -.0001393 .0000947 -1.47 0.142 -.0003253 .0000468 
_cons 38.99232 1.299989 29.99 0 36.43969 41.54496 
R2 = 0.4131       
       
       
*Colorado       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006626 0.0001464 4.53 0 0.0003726 0.0009526 
dist_spend .0014362 .0006719 2.14 0.035 .0001053 .0027671 
_cons .3008709 6.973571 0.04 0.966 -13.51243 14.11417 
R2 = 0.1904       
       
       
*Connecticut       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006788 0.0000759 8.95 0 0.0005287 0.0008289 
dist_spend -.0017515 .000535 -3.27 0.001 -.0028104 -.0006925 
_cons 76.33662 8.274251 9.23 0 59.96085 92.71238 
R2 = 0.3918       
       
       
*Delaware       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0012365 0.0004951 2.50 0.030 .0001468 .0023261 
dist_spend -.0036058 .0013557 -2.66 0.022 -.0065896 -.000622 
_cons 85.99635 18.87913 4.56 0.001 44.44366 127.549 
R2 = 0.4840       
       
       
*Florida       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008376 0.0002161 3.88 0 0.0004056 0.0012697 
dist_spend -.0031588 .0014669 -2.15 0.035 -.0060921 -.0002255 
_cons 59.06775 13.99486 4.22 0 31.0833 87.0522 
R2 = 0.2579       
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*Georgia       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0013665 0.0001508 9.06 0 .0010688 .0016642 
dist_spend -.0030811 .0005775 -5.34 0 -.0042209 -.0019412 
_cons 34.54841 6.486806 5.33 0 21.74441 47.3524 
R2 = 0.4110       
        
Idaho       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0005269 0.0001967 2.68 0.009 .0001361 .0009177 
dist_spend -.000474 .0003352 -1.41 0.161 -.00114 .0001919 
_cons 80.32617 3.846383 20.88 0 72.68349 87.96885 
R2 = 0.0755       
 
       
Illinois       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0011217 0.0000575 19.53 0 .0010089 0.0012346 
dist_spend -.0001532 .0002349 -0.65 0.514 -.0006146 .0003081 
_cons 4.856095 2.244326 2.16 0.031 .4486518 9.263539 
R2 = 0.4456       
       
       
*Indiana       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0006417 0.000103 6.23 0 0.0004387 .0008446 
dist_spend -.0024398 .0003764 -6.48 0 -.003181 -.0016985 
_cons 86.78558 4.8729 17.81 0 77.18878 96.38238 
R2 = 0.3210       
       
       
Iowa       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008613 0.0001317 6.54 0 0.0006022 0.0011204 
dist_spend -.0002272 .0005604 -0.41 0.685 -.0013301 .0008757 
_cons 50.40782 6.589036 7.65 0 37.43943 63.37622 
R2 = 0.1310       
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*Kentucky       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0008698 .0001277 6.81 0 .0006173 .0011224 
dist_spend -.0016341 .0006177 -2.65 0.009 -.0028554 -.0004127 
_cons 44.80503 5.728165 7.82 0 33.47798 56.13208 
R2 = 0.2567       
       
       
Louisiana       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0008359 .0001776 4.71 0 .0004795 .0011923 
dist_spend .0002122 .0003128 0.68 0.500 -.0004155 .0008399 
_cons -4.980199 5.238323 -0.95 0.346 -15.49166 5.531265 
R2 = 0.3055       
       
       
Maine       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0013618 .000182 7.48 0 .0010011 .0017224 
dist_spend .0000397 .0000571 0.69 0.489 -.0000735 .0001529 
_cons 26.43052 5.017973 5.27 0 16.48402 36.37701 
R2 = 0.3418       
 
 
Maryland       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income -.0001565 .0002742 -0.57 0.576 -.0007351 .000422 
dist_spend -.0009517 .0018876 -0.50 0.621 -.0049342 .0030307 
_cons 52.71611 25.91074 2.03 0.058 -1.950769 107.383 
R2 = 0.0365       
       
       
*Massachusetts      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .000872 .0000623 13.99 0 .0007485 .0009955 
dist_spend -.0011576 .0003015 -3.84 0 -.001755 -.0005603 
_cons 52.53296 4.608926 11.40 0 43.40096 61.66495 
R2 = 0.6430       
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*Michigan       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0013403 .0000708 18.92 0 .0012011 .0014795 
dist_spend -.0013157 .0002764 -4.76 0 -.0018587 -.0007727 
_cons 17.71824 2.923786 6.06 0 11.97339 23.46309 
R2 =0.4275       
       
       
*Mississippi       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0011859 .0002513 4.72 0 .0006885 .0016833 
dist_spend -.0013812 .0005553 -2.49 0.014 -.0024802 -.0002823 
_cons 49.61099 7.900863 6.28 0 33.97297 65.24901 
R2 = 0.2580       
       
       
Missouri       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0007826 .0001228 6.37 0 .0005412 .001024 
dist_spend .000169 .0004033 0.42 0.675 -.0006238 .0009618 
_cons 23.12981 3.805113 6.08 0 15.65097 30.60865 
R2 = 0.0985       
       
       
Montana       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0012469 .0001717 7.26 0 .0009081 .0015857 
dist_spend -.0001013 .0001601 -0.63 0.527 -.0004173 .0002146 
_cons 13.4495 5.164888 2.60 0.010 3.257598 23.6414 
R2 = 0.2319       
 
 
Nebraska       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0011923 .0004171 2.86 0.007 .0003512 .0020334 
dist_spend .0019251 .001361 1.41 0.164 -.0008195 .0046697 
_cons 14.5769 20.24277 0.72 0.475 -26.24654 55.40035 
R2 = 0.1708       
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Nevada       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0015458 .0003615 4.28 0.001 .0007582 .0023334 
dist_spend -.0002038 .0007002 -0.29 0.776 -.0017293 .0013218 
_cons 3.023615 12.99363 0.23 0.820 -25.28708 31.33431 
R2 = 0.6143       
       
       
New Hampshire      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0010532 .0001374 7.66 0 .0007807 .0013258 
dist_spend .0000231 .0003438 0.07 0.947 -.0006588 .000705 
_cons 17.26801 7.211221 2.39 0.018 2.966259 31.56977 
R2 = 0.3658       
       
       
New Jersey       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0006557 .0000465 14.10 0 .0005643 .0007472 
dist_spend -.0003847 .000205 -1.88 0.061 -.0007879 .0000184 
_cons 21.42161 3.828261 5.60 0 13.89425 28.94896 
R2 = 0.3472       
       
       
New Mexico       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0008912 .0002443 3.65 0 .0004049 .0013774 
dist_spend -.0003994 .0003848 -1.04 0.302 -.0011653 .0003665 
_cons 35.2653 7.238892 4.87 0 20.85665 49.67396 
R2 = 0.1569       
       
       
*New York       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0004202 .0000166 25.31 0 .0003876 .0004528 
dist_spend -.0001877 .0000418 -4.50 0 -.0002697 -.0001057 
_cons 6.368026 .7755573 8.21 0 4.844969 7.891083 
R2 = 0.5301       
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North Carolina 
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0016241 .0002017 8.05 0 .0012243 .0020238 
dist_spend -.0005722 .0005442 -1.05 0.295 -.0016511 .0005066 
_cons 3.428475 7.347773 0.47 0.642 -11.13763 17.99458 
R2 = 0.4107       
       
       
*Ohio       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .000752 .0000451 16.69 0 .0006635 .0008405 
dist_spend -.002266 .0002128 -10.65 0 -.0026839 -.001848 
_cons 87.97877 2.011572 43.74 0 84.02723 91.9303 
R2 = 0.3596       
       
       
Oregon       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0013281 .0001605 8.27 0 .0010109  .0016453 
dist_spend .0001497 .0002719 0.55 0.583 -.0003876 .0006869 
_cons 10.15778 5.044345 2.01 0.046 .1900925 20.12548 
R2 = 0.3148       
       
       
*Pennsylvania       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0013134 .000061 21.53 0 .0011935 .0014332 
dist_spend -.0017552 .0002612 -6.72 0 -.0022684 -.001242 
_cons 30.05722 2.998178 10.03 0 24.16589 35.94856 
R2 = 0.4945       
       
       
Rhode Island       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0013159 .0001087 12.10 0 .0010924 .0015393 
dist_spend -.0004066 .0002333 -1.74 0.093 -.000886 .0000729 
_cons -3.897939 4.401524 -0.89 0.384 -12.9454 5.149523 
R2 = 0.8551       
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*South Carolina      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0012767 .0002245 5.69 0 .0008297 .0017237 
dist_spend -.0033038 .0006116 -5.40 0 -.0045215 -.0020862 
_cons 69.7105 7.913 8.81 0 53.95693 85.46407 
R2 = 0.4689       
 
 
Tennessee       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0013062 .000176 7.42 0 .0009575 .0016549 
dist_spend -.001246 .0008706 -1.43 0.155 -.0029707 .0004788 
_cons 34.10517 7.265978 4.69 0 19.70996 48.50039 
R2 = 0.3277       
       
       
Texas       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0008533 .0000612 13.94 0 0.0007332 0.0009734 
dist_spend -.0000829 .0001794 -0.46 0.644 -.0004349 .0002692 
_cons 20.66114 2.296338 9.00 0 16.1547 25.16759 
R2 = 0.1692       
       
       
*Utah       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .000596 .0001943 3.07 0.004 .0002015 .0009905 
dist_spend -.0010969 .0005254 -2.09 0.044 -.0021635 -.0000302 
_cons 38.36288 5.783409 6.63 0 26.62193 50.10382 
R2 = 0.2645       
       
       
Vermont       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0011322 .0002298 4.93 0 .0006753 .0015891 
dist_spend .0000272 .0004357 0.06 0.06 -.000839 0008934 
_cons 14.11312 9.141593 1.54 0.126 -4.062819 32.28905 
R2 = 0.2222       
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Virginia       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0003201 .0000856 3.74 0 .00015 .0004902 
dist_spend -.0004638 .0003636 -1.28 0.205 -.0011862 .0002585 
_cons 29.71019 3.900072 7.62 0 21.96318 37.45721 
R2 = 0.1346       
       
       
Washington       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .0009872 .0000974 10.14 0 .0007952 .0011791 
dist_spend -.000345 .0002753 -1.25 0.212 -.0008877 .0001977 
_cons 32.92016 4.207978 7.82 0 24.62642 41.2139 
R2 = 0.3419       
 
 
West Virginia      
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income .00103 .0002685 3.84 0 0 .0004909 0.0015691 
dist_spend -.0001621 .0008153 -0.20 0.843 -.0017988 .0014747 
_cons 25.63321 11.62972 2.20 0.032 2.285566 48.98086 
R2 = 0.2299       
       
       
*Wisconsin       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0008004 0.0000528 15.16 0 0.0006966 0.0009043 
dist_spend -0.0006447 0.0002111 -3.05 0.002 -.00106 -.0002294 
_cons 30.9641 2.877458 10.76 0 25.30381 36.62439 
R2 = 0.4270       
       
       
Wyoming       
pctpass Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
dist_income 0.0007657 0.0003184 2.40 0.020 0.0001239 0.0014075 
dist_spend -.0005507  .0003502 -1.57 0.123 -.0012564      .000155 
_cons 62.41129      12.6455 4.94 0.000 36.92596     87.89662 
R2 = 0.2190       
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Appendix D 
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